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A Meta-Analysis, HARV. MED. SCH. DIV. ON ADDICTION (Dec. 15, 1997)); ROBERT
J. WILLIAMS ET AL, THE POPULATION PREVALENCE OF PROBLEM GAMBLJNG:
METHODOLOGICAL INFLUENCES, STANDARDIZED RATES, JURISDICTIONAL
DIFFERENCES & WORLDWIDE TRENDS 5 (2012) (noting that, internationally,
problem gambling rates range from 0.5% to 7.6% and depicting adult prevalence
available at
rates of problem gambling among states and territories in the U.
https://www .uleth.ca/dspace/bitstream/handle/l 0133/3068/2012-PREVALENCEOPGRC%20%282%29 .pdf?sequence=3; Problem Gambling, HARV. MENTAL
HEALTH LETTER (March 2004), available at http://wwvv.health.harvard.edu/
newsweek/Problem_gambling.htm (noting that "about 1% of American adultsnearly 3 million people-are pathological gamblers" and "[a]nother 2%-3% have
less serious but still significant problems, and as many as 15 million are at risk");
Casino Expansion and Its Impact on Pathological & Problem Gambling
Prevalence Rates, AM. GAMING Ass'N,http://www.americangaming.org/industryresources/research/fact-sheets/history··problem-gambling-prevalence-rates
visited June 30, 2015) (depicting the prevalence of problem and pathological
gambling from 1976 through 2008, in which 2.3 % and 0.6 % of the United States
population were problem and pathological gamblers, respectively). Although these
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phenomenon, 3 it is indisputable that persons unable to control their gambling
can bring rninous consequences upon themselves and others. 4 Stories abound
about lawyers losing their licenses because they divert funds from client funds
to feed their gambling habits. 5 People are stunned when a Monsignor
embezzles $650,000 from his church to support a video poker addiction. 6
Stories like these bring problem gambling into stark relief. The consequences
of problem gambling may not be limited to the gambler; problem gambling
may represent one of the most serious threats to the vitality, and certainly the
growth, of the gaming industry itself. 7 If there is a perception that the industry

statistics appear similar at first blush, when taken in the aggregate, the difference in
numbers of problem and pathological gamblers nationwide is significant. This
Article will not analyze the issue of how many problem gamblers there are in the
United States. Instead, it assumes there are sufficient numbers to constitute a public
policy issue and to warrant attention.
3
There are a number of terms used in this setting. Examples include
"pathological gambling," "problem gambling," and "gambling disorder." See, e.g.,
AM. GAMING Ass'N, supra note 2 (using the terms "problem gambling" and
"pathological gambling"); AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 585 (5th ed. 2013) (using the term "gambling
disorder"). In this Article, the term "problem gambling" will typically be used
unless the discussion is making specific reference to other terminology.
4
See, e.g., N.Y. Council on Problem Gambling, The Faces
Problem
Gambling, KNOW THE ODDS, http://knowtheodds.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/
KTO_FacesOfPG.pdf (last visited June 30, 2015).
5
See, e.g., Francis McCabe, Suspended Lawyer Avoids Prison in Gambling
Case, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/
crime-courts/ suspended-lawyer-avoids-prison-gambling-case (discussing the story
of Nevada attorney Doug Crawford, who was suspended from practice for five
years for "gambling away more than $300,000 of his clients' money"); Trish
Mehaffey, Disbarred Cedar Rapids Lawyer Pleads Guilty to Wire Fraud in
Federal Court, GAZETTE (Oct. 20, 2014), http://thegazette.com/subject/news/public
-safety/crime/fraud/disbarred-cedar-rapids-lawyer-pleads-guilty-to-wire-fraud-infederal-court-20141020 (discussing the story of Iowa attorney Susan Hense, "who
stole more than $800,000 from clients" to fuel her gambling addiction).
6
Ken Ritter, Kevin McAuliffe, Vegas Priest, Arrives at Texas Federal Prison
for Stealing $650,000, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 14, 2012, 1:19 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/14/vegas-priest-goes-to-prison_n_1425696.html.
7
It has often been said that problem gambling is the "Achilles Heel" of
legalized gambling. See, e.g., Torana Granston, Gambling Addiction: An Achilles
Heel for Locals, TODAY ST. MAARTEN (July 26, 2012, 12:44 PM), http://www.
todaysxm.com/2012/071261 gambling-addiction-an-achilles-heel-for-locals; Michael
Jonas, The Casino Debate's Achilles' Heel: "Problem Gamblers" Account for a
Disproportionate Share of Casino Revenues, COMMONWEALTH (Sept. 15, 2011),
http://www .commonwealthmagazine.org/V oices/Back-Story/2011/Summer/011Othecasino-debates-Achilles-heel.aspx.
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is insensitive to the issue or, worse, is taking advantage of these people, the
popular reaction could be damaging.
Among the mechanisms that have been developed to address problem
gambling is self-exclusion, a process by which a gambler signs a form banning
him from gambling. 8 The exclusion form may be executed with and limited to
an individual casino; 9 or, a state regulatory body may administer the process
with application to all licensed facilities in that jurisdiction. 10 Twenty-three
states have self-exclusion programs (SEPs) of some type for casino gambling. 11
In several instances, the casinos involved are tribal casinos and the selfexclusion process could be a component of the compacting process under the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). 12 The specifics of the SEPs vary
considerably between jurisdictions. 13 Even with these variations, however,
SEPs have many common characteristics and similar objectives. 14
SEPs should be encouraged, because they represent an opportunity for the
problem gambler to take responsibility for his or her actions. Indeed, there is
evidence that SEPs can be a helpful part of the effort to address problem

8
See, e.g., Self-Exclusion Program, IOWA GAMING Ass'N, http://www.iowa
gaming.org/responsible_gaming/self-exclusion.aspx (last visited June 30, 2015);
Voluntmy Exclusion Program Frequently Asked Questions, Mo. GAMING COMM'N,
http://www.mgc.dps.mo.gov/DAP/dap_faq.html (last visited June 30, 2015); Self
Exclusion Program FAQ, PA. GAMING CONTROL BD., http://gamingcontrolboard.pa
.gov/?p=67 (last visited June 30, 2015).
9
See, e.g., Responsible Gaming, REMINGTON PARK RACING CASINO, http://
www.remingtonpark.com/Casino/Responsible_Gaming/ (last visited June 30,
2015); Responsible Gambling, TWIN RIVER CASINO, http://www.twinriver.com/
casino/responsible-gambling/ (last visited June 30, 2015).
10 See, e.g., IOWA GAMING Ass'N, Iowa Statewide and Lifetime Self-Exclusion
Form, available at http://www.iowagaming.org/support/pdf/Self-Exclusion_Form.
pdf (July 1, 2011); IND. GAMING COMM'N, Request for Enrollment in the Voluntary
Exclusion
(YEP), available at http://www.in.gov/igc/files/vep-application
-sample.pdf (last visited June
2015).
11 See infra Appendix (detailing the self-exclusion programs offered by states).
12 See, e.g., MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN AGUA CALIENTE BAND
OF CAHUILLA INDIANS, A FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIAN TRIBE, & THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA § 103 .1 ( c), available at http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/documents/enabling/
2008/MOA%20Agua%20Caliente.pdf; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(l)(B)-(C)
(specifying that casino games, termed Class III games by IGRA, can only be
conducted on tribal lands in a state which "permits such gaming," and only
pursuant to a compact between the state and the tribe); see also 25 U.S.C.
§ 270l(d)(3)(A)-(C) (suggesting that terms relating to problem gambling are
appropriate subjects of compact negotiation between the state and the tribe).
13
See generally infra Appendix.
14
See id.
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gambling. 15 However, as will be discussed, for SEPs to be effective they need
to be integrated into an ethos of treatment for problem gamblers, and not used
as a mechanism for punishment. 16 Moreover, regardless of the details and
structure of SEPs, they are not panaceas, and their effectiveness should not be
overstated. 17 This Article will consider some of the limitations of SEPs as a
way of addressing problem gambling. While SEPs can be useful in the efforts
to combat problem gambling, their use should not detract from other important
steps that can-and perhaps should-be taken to diminish the incidence of this
undesirable effect of regulated gambling. 18
H.

BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF SEPS

The first SEP in the United States was developed in Missouri in 1996 "in
response to a citizen's request to be banned from the state's excursion gambling
boats because he found himself unable to control his gambling." 19 According to
then Executive Director of the Missouri Gaming Commission, as the Missouri
program was developed, some members of the "treatment community" argued

15
See Sarah E. Nelson et al., One Decade of Self Exclusion: Missouri Casino
Self Excluders Four to Ten Years After Enrollment, 26 J. GAMBLING STUD. 129,
130 (20 l 0) (citing Robert Ladouceur et al., Analysis of a Casino's Self-Exclusion
Program, 16 J. GAMBLING STUD. 453 (2000); Robert Ladouceur et aL, SelfExclusion Program: A Longitudinal Evaluation Study, 23 J. GAMBLING STUD. 85
(2007)).
16 See infra notes 43, 47-49, 61 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 48, 50 and accompanying text; see generally Nelson et al.,
supra note 15, at 130-31, 135-37 (discussing the effectiveness of SEPs).
18 See,
e.g., Amaia Guenaga, Note, Improving the Odds: Changing the
Perception of Problem Gambling and Supporting the Growth of Problem Gambling
Courts, 2 UNLV GAMING L.J. 133, 142--47 (2011) (discussing the inception of
problem gambling courts to assist gamblers in ameliorating their addictions);
Advocacy, NAT'L COUNCIL ON PROBLEM GAMBLING, http://www.ncpgambling.org/
programs-resources/advocacy/ (last visited June 30, 2015) (stating that the National
Council on Problem Gambling "advocat[es] for programs and services to assist
problem gamblers and their families" focusing on "prevention, education,
treatment, enforcement, and research"). This Article will focus on SEPs that states
have for casinos and similar forms of gambling. It will not address programs
offered by state lotteries or tribal casinos. For a brief discussion of the issues
inherent in lottery exclusion programs, see Whitney Woodward, Gamblers Can Opt
Out ofBig Lotto Jackpots, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 17, 2007), http://articles.chicagotribune.
com/2007-10-17/news/0710160645_1 _lottery-tickets-scratch-off-tickets-illinoislottery (discussing an Illinois state program designed to deter problem gamblers
from buying lottery tickets).
19 Self-Exclusion 101, AM. GAMING Ass'N (Jan. 1, 2003), https://web.archive.
org/web/20141120084930/http://www.americangaming.org/newsroom/newsletters/
responsible-gaming-quarterly/self-exclusion- 10 l [hereinafter Self-Exclusion 101].
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that a SEP was a bad idea. 20
[Members of the treatment community] noted that while our intentions
were good, the only way people can truly get better is if they take
control and take on the responsibility for keeping themselves out of the
casinos . . . . It is wrong to put the responsibility in the casino's hands
because then the individual never really takes a step in acknowledging
his problem or trying to fix it. And this allows him to ultimately blame
the casino ifhe fails. 1
The emphasis of the Missouri program was that "the problem gambler
agrees to accept responsibility for staying off excursion gambling boats by
adding himself to the List of Disassociated Persons."22 A person on the list
could be subject to arrest for trespass and other sanctions if he or she entered a
casino. 23 Under the program, casinos were obligated to remove enrollees from
their direct marketing lists and deny them check cashing privileges and
participation in players' clubs. 24 Although a casino could be penalized for
knowingly allowing such people to gamble, the Executive Director stated that,
"[y]ou can't penalize a casino for the occasional screw-up in their database ...
. That's just part of business."25
Twenty-two states have followed Missouri's lead in establishing different
forms of SEPs. 26 SEPs have many common features. For example, all states
require the gambler to apply for inclusion in the SEP, rather than allowing a
request by the gambler's family members. 27 Likewise, a hallmark of all SEPs is
that privileges such as membership in loyalty programs, earning "comps,"28
issuance of credit, and check cashing are lost.29 Most notably, the gambler in a
See id.
Id. (quoting then Executive Director of the Missouri Gaming Commission
Kevin Mullally).
22 Id.
23 Id. (noting that before paying a jackpot of $1,200 or more, a casino had to
see ifthe person was on the List of Disassociated Persons).
24 Id.
2s Id.
26 See infra Appendix.
27 See infra Appendix; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4834(a) (2014); 10200-203 DEL. ADMIN. CODE§ 7.16 (2015); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.745
(2014); 68 IND. ADMIN. CODE 6-3-2(b) (West 2014); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 112112-5(a) (2014); LAADMIN. CODE tit. 42, § 304(C)(l)-(2) (2014).
28 See Bill Burton, Comp Basics, ABOUT.COM, http://casinogambling.about.
com/cs/comps/a/compbasic.htm (last visited June 30, 2015) ("Comps are freebies
that the casino gives to its customers as a reward for their business. It is a way to ..
. entice player loyalty to the establishment.").
29 See infra Appendix; see, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.770(d)
20

21
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SEP who violates the terms and returns to gamble agrees to forfeit any
30

There are some differences among SEPs, as well. One notable difference is
the length of time for which the self-exclusion operates. 31 Several states
that a gambler who enrolls in a SEP is agreeing to a lifetime
exclusion. 32 More common is a graduated approach where the term of
exclusion can be one, three, five, or even ten years, with a lifetime exclusion
also being available. 33
Another area of variation in state SEPs is whether a gambler who enrolls in
the SEP can later change his or her mind and seek removal from the list Most
states allow for "reinstatement" upon the petition of the gambler, 34 or make
reinstatement automatic upon the expiration of the term of the self-exclusion. 35
Nevada-with its long history of gaming regulation--is a reference
standard for nearly any gambling issue. Nevada's treatment of SEPs is
especially notable. Because of the number of gaming venues in the state--both
full casinos and licensees who have "restricted" licenses, which allow a limited
number of electronic games to be offered36-it is considered impractical to
have a state administered program. 37 Responsible gaming measures,

(2014); KAN. ADMIN. REGS .. § l 12-l 12-8(b) (2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
27:27.l(C)(ll) (2014); 16-633-13 ME. CODER. § 6(3)(A) (2015). See also Self
Exclusion, PROBLEM GAMBLING COAL. OF COLO., http://www.problemgambling
colorado.org/content/self-exclusion (last visited June 30, 2015).
30 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 432.225(4)(e)(ii) (West 2014); 13-003
MISS. CODER.§ 10.l(a) (LexisNexis 2015); Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 11, § 4517.010(2)(B) (2015).
31 See
Appendix.
32
e.g., IOWA CODE § 99F.4(22) (2015); MICH, COMP. LAWS ANN. §
432.225(5) (West 2014); Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit 11, § 45-l 7.020(1)(A) (2015).
33 See
infra Appendix; see, e.g., DEL. LOTTERY, Request for Voluntary
Exclusion from All Delaware Video Lottery Facilities, http://www.delottery.com/
pdfNideoLotterySelfExApp.pdf, at 1 (offering patrons the options to self-exclude
for one year, five years, or lifetime); ME. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
Maine Se~f Exclusion Program, http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/samhs/osa/help/
gambling/selfexclusion ("A person can choose to self-exclude for 1 year, 3 years, 5
PROBLEM GAMBLING COAL. OF COLO.,
Casino
years, or for lifetime.
Self-Exclusion Application & Waiver, available at http://www.coloradogaming.
com/index.php/download_file/view/21 (offering patrons the options to self-exclude
for three years, five years, ten years, or lifetime).
34
e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE§ 13:69G-2.5(a) (2015); OHIO ADMIN. CODE§
3772-12-0S(B) (2015); 58 PA. CODE§ 503a.5(a) (2015).
35
13-003 MISS. CODER§ 10.5(a) (LexisNexis 2015).
36 See NEV. REV. STAT.
463.0189, .161 (2014).
37 See Kevin Ferguson, Casino Self-Exclusion Programs Grow,
Called a
'Work in Progress,' LAS VEGAS SUN (Oct. 31, 2001, 10:01 AM), http://www.las
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SEPs, are the responsibility of individual casinos, licensees, and casmo
companies, 38 though having SEPs is not a condition oflicensure. 39
As will be discussed, the details of SEPs may have a bearing on their
effectiveness. But even when the specific features of SEPs are adjusted, the
question remains: how effective are SEPs in addressing problem gambling?
III.

ENROLLMENT AND ADMINISTRATION: WHO OPERATES THE SEP?

The fact a gambler seeks out a SEP is an indication that the gambler
vegassun. com/news/2001 I oct/31 I casino-self-exclusion-programs-grow-called-awork-/ ("[Carol O'Hare, Executive Director of the Nevada Council on Problem
Gambling, said] it's unrealistic to expect a program in Nevada like those in
Missouri or New Jersey because of the size of the industry in the Silver State.")
38 See NEV. GAMING REG. § 5.170 (2015); see also Responsible Gaming,
CAESARS ENTM'T, http://caesarscorporate.com/about-caesars/responsible-gaming/
(last visited June 30, 2015); Responsible Gaming, BELLAGIO LAS VEGAS, https://
www.bellagio.com/casino/responsible-gaming.aspx (last visited June 30, 2015);
Responsible Gaming, WYNN LAS VEGAS, http://www.wynnlasvegas.com/Casino/
ResponsibleGaming (last visited June 30, 2015).
39 See NEV. GAMING REG. § 5.170 (2014) (requiring licensees to adopt
"programs to address problem gambling" only under certain circumstances).
Specifically, the Regulations require that:
Each licensee that engages in the issuance of credit, check cashing,
or the direct mail marketing of gaming opportunities, shall
implement a program containing the elements described below, as
appropriate, that allows patrons to self-limit their access to the
issuance of credit, check cashing, or direct mail marketing by that
licensee. As appropriate, such program shall contain, at a
minimum, the following:
(a) The development of written materials for dissemination to
patrons explaining the program;
(b) The development of written forms allowing patrons to
participate in the program;
(c) Standards and procedures that allow a patron to be
prohibited from access to check cashing, the issuance of
credit, and the participation in direct mail marketing of
gaming opportunities;
(d) Standards and procedures that allow a patron to be
removed from the licensee's direct mailing and other direct
marketing regarding gaming opportunities at that licensee's
location; and
(e) Procedures and forms requiring the patron to notify a
designated office of the licensee within 10 days of the
patron's receipt of any financial gaming privilege, material or
promotion covered by the program.
NEV. GAMING REG.§ 5.170(4)
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recognizes the need to address his or her gambling behavior. 40 While there is
considerable variation among jurisdictions, the SEP enrollment process can
significantly impact the effectiveness of the program. 41 For example, if the
gambler enrolls by going to a casino, it is very likely he or she will be dealing
with casino employees who have little or no training in dealing with issues of
problem gambling. In fact, the matter may be viewed as a "security issue," 42
and in some respects that may be true; people who are on exclusion lists of any
type, by definition, should not be on the premises, and keeping them off or
ejecting them would seem to fall under the rubric of security. But this
underscores an important limitation of many SEPs. When enrollment in, and
enforcement of, SEPs is perceived as a matter of security, the orientation of the
SEP is punitive and not therapeutic. 43 Security personnel are not trained to
evaluate the need for other interventions that a person enrolling in a SEP may
require. 44 Like other casino employees, they are not social workers, nor should
they be expected to act as such.
One way of addressing the enrollment issue is to train the person in charge
of a casino's SEP to inform enrolling gamblers of psychological counseling
services available to the gambler. 45 SEPs could thus serve as a gateway to other
40 See Sally M. Gainsbury, Review of Self-Exclusion from Gambling Venues as
an Intervention for Problem Gambling, 30 J. GAMBLING STUD. 229, 246 (2014)
("A gambler's willingness to address their adverse gambling behaviours [sic]
precedes self-exclusion in most cases.").
41
See id. at 246-4 7.
42
Id. at 232 ("Venue security personnel typically enforce self-exclusion
policies."); From Enforcement to Assistance: Evolving Best Practices in SelfExclusion, RESPONSIBLE GAMBLING COUNCIL 7 (March 2008) [hereinafter
RESPONSIBLE GAMBLING COUNCIL], available at http://www.responsiblegambling
.org/docs/research-reports/from-enforcement-to-assistance-evolving-best-practicesin-self-exclusion.pdf?sfvrsn=8.
43
RESPONSIBLE GAMBLING COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 7 (noting that "the
process of self-exclusion can be improved" by "mov[ing] self-exclusion from the
currently predominant enforcement orientation to an individual assistance
orientation."). See also Alex Blaszczynski et al., Self-Exclusion: A Proposed
Gateway to Treatment Model, 7 INT'L GAMBLING STUD. 59, 67 (2007) (suggesting
the need for SEPs to shift "from a punitive approach to an individual, clientcentered [sic] or skills-based humanistic model where the focus is on enhancing
internal controls of the individual to assist them in regaining control over gambling
behavior").
44 Blaszczynski et al., supra note 43, at 65 ("Gaming operators invested with
the authority to complete a self-exclusion order in consultation with the gamblers
generally do not have formal qualifications in behavioural [sic] health sciences or
the requisite skills to undertake a competent clinical assessment of the
psychological status, specific needs of the gambler, or the capacity to identify and
respond to suicidal risk.").
45 See id. at 65, 67.
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treatment. 46 In addition, the connection between the casino and the counseling
services would allow for better monitoring of the effectiveness of the SEP. 47
However, there is a question of how eager casinos would be to hire personnel
or otherwise invest in the resources to perform this task. 48 There is another
problem with the casino serving as the place of enrollment. If a person decides
he or she wants to self-exclude after leaving a gaming venue, it is a bad idea to
tell the person that he or she needs to return to the very place that is the source
of the problem. Problem gamblers should not be in casinos.
Another possibility is for states to administer SEPs. If casinos do not want
to train employees to act as educators and sources of information for problem
gamblers, the state could take on the SEP function with trained personnel
whose salaries are paid by dedicated gaming revenues. 49 Centralization of the
SEP mechanism would provide consistency in application and would
emphasize that problem gambling is a public health concem. 50 State employees
could deal individually with those enrolling in the SEP and integrate the SEP
with other interventions and counseling that would be appropriate. 51
Such a robust and comprehensive approach would require considerable
human and financial resources, and casinos would likely resist additional taxes
on gaming revenues to subsidize it. 52 Moreover, the state-centered

See id. at 65.
See id. at 64 (noting the "need for concurrent counseling interventions" to
go along with self-exclusion programs).
48 See id. at 62 ("[The gaming] industry has invested more resources in
defending the credibility of self-exclusion programmes [sic] than in developing an
effective, integrated system of self-exclusion that complements other harm
minimization measures or in introducing appropriate systems for outcome
monitoring").
49 Cf id. at 67-69 (proposing a self-exclusion model that "utilizes a qualified
trained educator system that provides monitoring in a supportive environment . . .
for the gambler" and "recognizes the on-going need for gaming venues to
participate actively ... and provide vigilant, continuous support to participants").
50 See id. at 65 (noting the effectiveness of self-exclusion programs is limited
by a "lack of a centralized management system"); LIA NOWER, RUTGERS UNIV.
CTR. FOR GAMBLING STUD., SELF-EXCLUSION: LEGAL & POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
22, available at http://massgaming.com/wp-content/uploads/l 0-Self-ExclusionPrograms-Legal-and-Policy-Considerations.pdf (discussing the need for a
centralized system).
51 See Blaszczynski et al., supra note 43, at 67-68.
52
Many states dedicate a certain amount of money to assist in problem
gambling initiatives. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 458A.070 (2014). But see
Zhidong Hao et al., In Search of Best Practices in Responsible Gaming (RG): A
Comparative Study of RG among Macau, Las Vegas, and Melbourne Casinos, 18
GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 361, 367 (2014) (discussing that when states experience
budget problems, funds for problem gambling may be an easy target for cuts).
46
47
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administration of SEPs would not work in Nevada, where, as stated earlier, a
statewide SEP is viewed as not feasible. 53 A problem gambler in Nevada who
executes a SEP at one gaming property could simply walk across the street and
gamble at another venue without violating the terms of a SEP. 54
Because of the complicated pathology of compulsive gambling, 55 it is
uncertain what role self-exclusions can play in addressing the issue. 56 Some
researchers maintain that there has been "minimal robust and comprehensive
research" evaluating the effectiveness of SEPs. 57 If SEPs are going to be used,
continuing research on their optimal construction and implementation is
essential, as the form of the programs will have a significant impact on their
effectiveness.
Some treatment professionals praise SEPs as an important service that
helps problem gamblers to limit further loss. 58 When gamblers use SEPs it
"demonstrates that individuals accept to some degree that their gambling is
excessive and causing harm, recognize a need to take personal responsibility to
address the issue and demonstrate motivation to become active participants in
the process." 59 But they caution that SEPs do "not constitute a formal treatment
intervention."60 Their greatest value is when they can be part of an integrated
approach tailored to the individual needs of the gambler. 61 Ultimately,
transforming SEPs from a punitive to a therapeutic orientation requires a
formidable commitment of resources. It remains to be seen whether this
commitment exists, regardless of who administers the SEP.
See Ferguson, supra note 37.
However, some casino companies which own numerous gaming properties
apply the SEP to all their properties. See, e.g., CAESARS ENTM'T, supra note 38
("Our 'self-restriction' program allows a person to request not to receive direct
marketing by Caesars owned, managed, or operated properties, as well as be denied
credit and check cashing privileges. Our 'self-exclusion' program allows a guest to
request to have all privileges, including play privileges denied at all Caesars
owned, managed, or operated properties.").
55 See Gainsbury, supra note 40, at 230 ("Problem gambling appears to be
caused by a complex interaction between individual factors and a range of social
and environmental influences .... "(citing to other studies)).
56 See id. at 230, 246-47.
57 . Id. at 229.
58 Gainsbury, supra note 40, at 246 ("The assessments of self-exclusion
programs internationally generally find that the majority of participants benefit
from such schemes.").
59 Blaszczynski et al., supra note 43, at 60.
60 Id.
61 Seif-Exclusion 101, supra note 19 ("Self-exclusion alone does nothing to
help get problem gamblers into treatment. It has to be part of a larger
comprehensive treatment initiative." (quoting Keith Whyte, Executive Director of
the National Council on Problem Gambling) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
53

54
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ENFORCEMENT OF THE SEP

If problem gamblers who enrolled in SEPs always observed their terms and
stayed away from gambling venues, it would be easier to assess the
contribution of SEPs to the reduction of problem gambling. Unfortunately, this
is not the case. 62 The violation of SEPs by gamblers raises some of the most
vexing problems of SEPs.
The very fact a gambler enrolls in a SEP suggests an understanding of his
or her responsibility to stay away from the casino. 63 But research shows that
many self-excluded gamblers believe it is the responsibility of the casino to
enforce the provisions of the SEP, 64 though this is not a universally held view. 65
The feeling that it is the casino's role to identify and exclude may be a function
of the punitive, law-enforcement focus of the SEP. But regardless of the
gambler's view of his or her responsibility, it does raise the question of the
casino's role in enforcing the self-exclusion.
SEPs can be enforced at a higher level of confidence if casinos take certain
precautions. For example, before a gambler enters a gaming venue, he or she
could be required to provide identification to security persom1el. The gambler's
name could then be checked against the list of those who have self-excluded for
that property, or if statewide exclusions are used, against that list. Establishing
and maintaining such a database would not seem to be an especially costly
matter. 66 Many casinos in Europe require gamblers to show identification
before entering the gaming venue. 67 Such action would also allow for the

62 See RESPONSIBLE GAMBLING COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 10 (discussing a
focus group survey of self-excluders of which "30% gambled at the banned venue
and 59% engaged in other forms of gambling during their bans"); see also Nelson,
et al., supra note 15, at 130 (discussing a study of self-excluded individuals that
concluded "36% returned to the casino and 50% continued to gamble at other
venues during their exclusion period").
63 See Blaszcynski et al., supra note 43 at 64; Gainsbury, supra note 40, at
246.
64 See Blaszcynski et al., supra note 43 at 64.
65 Id.; Carol O'Hare, Self-Exclusion--Concept vs. Reality, 8 GAMING L. REV.
189, 190 (2004) ("The self-exclusion agreement was intended to be a positive,
healthy roadblock in the face of the unhealthy temptations of the addiction. For this
reason, the program was designed to place the bulk of responsibility and burden of
compliance upon the individual who asked to be excluded, not on the institutions
who implemented and monitored the process.").
66 Indeed, some states already require the creation and maintenance of such
databases. E.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 61D-14.020(2) (2015); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit.
11, § 1770.240(b) (2014) (requiring a self-exclusion database for state lottery); 205
MASS. CODE REGS.§ 133.05(1) (2015).
67 Gainsbury, supra note 40, at 244.
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screening of prospective underage gamblers. 68 Clearly,
such
enforcement measures would place a burden on casinos. 69
In casinos with a single means of access, identification checks would be
tenable, though certainly cumbersome. But for casinos with many
this would present a logistical nightmare, at least from the casino's perspective.
Moreover, it would suggest a fortress mentality that is not consistent with the
carefree image a gaming property would want to project. In most instances, the
practical barriers to identification checks, as a way to screen for self-exduded
gamblers before they enter a casino, have limited utility.
A fundamental requirement of regulated gaming is that casinos
underage persons from gambling. 70 Security persormel can check the
identification of a person in a gaming area who appears to be
Identifying a gambler who is on a self-exclusion list, however, is a much more
difficult undertaking. Dealers who conduct table games are trained to check
identification of a person who may be underage. This could be
to
check the identification of anyone playing a table game.
the extra
step of mnning the identification through the self-exclusion database will slow
play at the table. Slot or video poker machines could also be set so that a
71 The
"player's card" would have to be inserted during the time of
player's card could be cross-referenced to the self-exclusion list If the

For discussion and identification of the required
state, see Legal Gambling Age in the United States, LEGALGAMBLIN
http://www.legalgamblingusa.com/legal--gambling-agc.html (last visited June 30,
2015) (noting there are 37 states which require an individual to be 21
to participate in various forms of gambling, while J. 3 states require an age of 1
69 Casinos are notorious for not checking patron identification until it is in the
best interest of the casino to do so. See, e.g., Problem Gamblers Pose
Casinos.· A Roundtable Discussion, 14 GAMING L. REV. & ECON.
[hereinafter Roundtable Discussion]; Eric Zorn, Casino to Gambler: Heads We
Win, Tails You Lose, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 17, 2007), http://blogs.chicagotribune.com
/news_columnists_ezorn/2007/08/casino-to-gambLhtml.
70 See Underage Gambling, AM. GAMING Ass'N, http://www.americangaming
.org/industry-resources/research/fact-sheets/underage-gambling
visited June
30, 2015) ("Preventing underage gambling always has been a high priority for
commercial casino companies."); see also Code of Conduct, AM. GAMING
http://www.americangaming.org/social-responsibility/responsible-gaming/codeconduct (last visited June 30, 2015).
71 For an interesting perspective on the role of players' cards in
see
George Dvorsky, The Reason Casinos Track Your Behavior? To Lure You Into
Gambling too Much, 109.COM (June 12, 2012), http://io9.com/5917868/the-reasoncasinos-track-your-behavior-to-lure-you-into-gambling-too-much.
for SEP purposes, could be designed so that the information on the card was for
identification purposes only, and not for marketing purposes or for tracking the
amount the player was gambling.
68
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gambler's name was on the self-exclusion list, the machine would not operate
and security could be notified. In fact, a casino could require presentation of
identification for any form of gambling, whether in the form of table games,
machines, or sports books.
The precautions noted above, while certainly not failsafe, would give teeth
to SEPs. Moreover, since a self-excluded gambler would know he could not
gamble anonymously, his motivation to violate the self-exclusion might be
diminished. 72 Such a cumbersome process of identification verification, which
results in slower play and therefore less wagering, is not one that the casino
industry would be expected to support. This underscores a core limitation of
SEPs. 73 Without the industry committing significant resources to enforce the
SEPs, the burden falls on the gambler, the person who is already struggling
with gambling impulse control. It is fine to say that personal responsibility
must be placed on the individual,74 but promoting SEPs as an industry
commitment to addressing problem gambling is, without robust enforcement
partnership, disingenuous. At the same time, there is an intuitive sense that a
practical limit exists for what casinos can be expected to do to detect excluded
persons. Equipping employees with photos of excluded persons and having
them scour the premises and the faces of the many people coming and going in
a casino seems unrealistic, as does the use of facial recognition software. 75
The fact is, however, that casinos do find self-excluded gamblers on their
premises. 76 This can occur when a self-excluded person applies for a player's
card, cashes a check, or seeks credit. Identity verification in those settings is
routine and the self-excluded gambler would be detected. A self-excluded
person would likely be aware that these actions would reveal his or her
forbidden presence and avoid them. So if the self-excluded gambler does
eschew these contacts with casino personnel, how would he or she be caught?
See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 69, at 110 (quoting attorney Paul
West and noting that the reason why a self-excluded gambler would continue to
gamble and risk detection may be that the problem gambler views this as a
gratifying part of the "desire for risk").
73 See id. at 105 (noting that some heightened security undertakings by casinos
in relation to "[s]elf-exclusion[s] almost seem to work against the casino's interest"
(quoting Emir Aly Crowne Mohammed, Assistant Professor of Law, University of
Windsor, Ontario, Canada)).
74 Cf supra notes 40, 43 and accompanying text.
75
While facial recognition software may have some effectiveness in
identifying self-excluded gamblers, it is not clear that the technology is a best
practice that should be adopted by casinos. See RESPONSIBLE GAMBLING COUNCIL,
supra note 42, at 10 n.3 (making the point that while "[f]acial recognition has the
potential to be a valuable tool" in the effort to detect self-excluded gamblers,
verification of identity still requires human judgments and observations).
76
See, e.g., Swanson v. Horseshoe Hammond, LLC, 445 F. App'x 868, 869
(7th Cir. 2011).
72
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The trigger for discovery, ironically, may be that the gambler wins a
prize-often on a machine-that is substantial enough to require identification
before the gambler is paid. 77 Federal law requires that a Form W-2G be
completed when a gambler wins $1,200 or more on a slot machine. 78 Other
types of gambling winnings have different thresholds. 79 A self-excluded
gambler who defies the commitment to stay away, gambles undetected, and
adds to his or her miseries by losing, has no form to fill out. But the gambler
who hits a slot jackpot of $1,200, and seeks to collect it, can be arrested for
trespass. 80 The irony is compounded by the fact that self-exclusion agreements
almost universally provide that the gambler agrees to forfeit winnings from
gambling in violation of the agreement. 81 Thus, losses of a discovered violator
are not returned, but winnings are confiscated.
If a goal of a SEP is to provide disincentives to a gambler to dishonor his
or her enrollment, the forfeiture of winnings accomplishes that, and properly so
in the minds of many treatment professionals. 82 But this result may also explain
why casinos might not be fastidious in maintaining access controls to their
property. According to one treatment professional:
There are many recovering gamblers I have talked to in jurisdictions
without adequate access controls that have a very incredibly cynical
[perception]: "I can get back on the property, I can gamble, and they
will let me gamble as long as I am losing. It is only upon winning that

See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 69, at 105.
See IRS, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORMS W-2G & 5754, at 4 (2015) available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/iw2g. pdf.
79 See generally id. at 2-5 (identifying the specific reporting thresholds for
wagers in relation to horse and dog racing, jai alai, sweepstakes, wagering pools,
lotteries, bingo, keno, and poker tournaments).
80 See e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 432.225(13) (1997); KAN. ADMIN. REGS.
l 12-l 12-5(d)(l) (2015); 16-633-13 ME. CODE R. § 2(2)(A)(3)(e) (2015).
81 See infra Appendix; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4834(a) (2014) ("A
person may request placement on the list of self-excluded persons . . . by agreeing
that, during the period of voluntary exclusion, the person may not collect any
winnings or recover any losses resulting from any gaming activity ...."); KAN.
ADMIN. REGS. 112-112-6 (2015) ("Each person who has been placed on the selfexclusion list shall surrender to the commission all prizes, jackpots, chips or tokens
in play, pay vouchers, coupons, and electronic credits . . . obtained after the
person's placement on the self-exclusion list."); Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 11, §
45-l 7.020(1)(A) (2014) ("[T]he applicant agrees that once placed on the List ifs/he
is discovered on an excursion gambling boat, jackpots or winnings in his/her
possession at the time of discovery will be forfeited.").
82 RESPONSIBLE GAMBLING COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 11 ("There was a
reasonable consensus among ... experts that jackpot winnings should not be given
to a person who is in breach of their ban.").
77
78
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they seize my money and throw me back out." 83
With this in mind, what incentives are there for a casino to be vigilant in
enforcing self-exclusions? Forfeiture of winnings may create disincentives for
the casino, especially if the casino retains the funds that are forfeited by the
gambler. There are very few references in SEP statutes to what becomes of the
forfeited winnings. 84 It seems appropriate to direct such funds to the state or to
trust funds that are used for gambling treatment or prevention. 85
There are other undercmTents of skepticism regarding the industry's
commitment to enforcing SEPs. It is commonly stated that casinos want people
to gamble "for the right reasons-to simply have fun." 86 Fmther, the sentiment
that, "problem gambling is bad for the casino business," finds frequent
expression by industry responsible gaming sources. 87 But there is research that
concludes that problem gamblers make up a large percentage of casino revenue.
"Several jurisdiction-wide prevalence surveys have investigated the proportion
of revenues derived from problem gamblers" and "have found problem
gamblers to account for a disproportionate share of gaming revenue." 88 These
83 Roundtable Discussion, supra note 69, at 105 (quoting Keith Whyte,
Executive Director of the National Council on Problem Gambling in Washington,
D.C.).
84 But see IOWA CODE ANN. § 99F.4(22) (2014) ("[A]ny money or thing of
value that has been obtained by, or is owed to, a voluntary excluded person by a
licensee as a result of wagers made by the person after the person has been
voluntarily excluded shall not be paid to the person but shall be credited to the
general fund of the state.").
85 E.g., KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 112-112-6 (2014) ("The items surrendered to the
commission shall be liquidated or redeemed and shall be transferred to the state's
problem gambling and addictions fund."); see RESPONSIBLE GAMBLING COUNCIL,
supra note 42, at 11 ("[W]innings [sh]ould be kept in trust funds and used for
problem gambling treatment or prevention.").
86 CAESARS ENTM'T, supra note 38.
87
David Klepper, New York Needs Help with Gambling Addiction, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J. (Oct. 4, 2014, 7:50 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/
casinos-gaming/new-york-needs-help-gambling-addiction (quoting Jan Jones
Blackhurst, Caesars spokeswoman). Accord Rich Ryan, Inside Gaming: Further
Studies Regarding Problem Gambling, Boston Bickering, and More,
POKERNEWS.COM (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.pokemews.com/news/2013/08/
inside-gaming-further-studies-regarding-prob lem-gamb ling-bos-1607 0 .htm
("There's a very strong negative business agenda attached to problem gamblers ...
. It's bad for our reputation and bad for business." (quoting Itai Frieberger, Chief
Operating Officer of888 Holdings)).
88
ROBERT WILLIAMS & ROBERT WOOD, THE DEMOGRAPHIC SOURCES OF
ONTARIO GAMING REVENUE, ONTARIO PROBLEM GAMBLING RESEARCH CTR. 9
(2004 ), available at http://stoppredatorygambling.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/
The-Demographic-Sources-of-Ontario-Gaming-Revenue. pdf.
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studies found the proportion of revenue that came from problem gamblers was
33% in Australia, 15% in the United States, 23% in Canadian provinces, and
19% in New Zealand. 89
It is not surprising that small numbers of gamblers produce a large portion
ofa casino's revenues. "The Pareto Principle, or '80/20 rule'" maintains that 80
percent of revenue comes from 20 percent of a business's customers. 90 One
casino consultant has written that the 80/20 figure is not accurate for casinos;
rather, 90 percent of gaming revenues are produced by 10 percent of casino
customers. 91 In a study of 18,000 gamblers who held loyalty cards at Native
American casinos, "two professors found that 9.3% of the gamblers ...
produced 80% of the ... revenue." 92 Similarly, a study "of 4,222 Internet
gamblers who wagered ... on casino-style games of chance" found that, of
those "customers, just 2.8%-or 119 big losers-provided half of the casino's
take, and 10.7% provided 80% of the take." 93
Being a frequent casino customer, or a gambler who wagers large amounts
of money, does not make a person a problem gambler. But if a casino knows
that a gambler in breach of a self-exclusion is limited in his or her winnings, is
not limited in his or her losses, and that these people produce a considerable
portion of casino revenue, it strains credulity to think the casinos would regard
it in their interest to invest considerable resources in preventing self-excluded
gamblers from wagering. Where enforcing self-exclusion directly affects casino
revenues, the conflict of interest is fundamental and systemic. 94

89

Id. at 10, table 1.

Dave Lavinsky, Pareto Principle: How to Use it to Dramatically Grow
Your Business, FORBES (Jan. 20, 2014, 9:39 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
90

davelavinsky/2014/01/20/pareto-principle-how-to-use-it-to-dramatically-grow-your
-business/.
91 Andrew Klebanow, Marketing: How to Increase Gaming Revenue in an
Economic Downturn, INDIAN GAMING, Oct. 2011, at 70, available at http://www.
indiangaming.com/istore/Octl 1 Klebanow.pdf.
92 Mark Maremont & Alexandra Berzon, How Often do Gamblers Really
Win?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2013, 1:56 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001
424052702304626104579123383535635644 (discussing a database analysis
conducted by Puneet Manchanda of the University of Michigan and Hee Mok Park
of the University of Connecticut).
93 Id.
94 See Blaszczynski et al., supra note 43, at 65-66 ("Tension exists among
gaming industry operators between promoting a legitimate commercial product for
profit and implementing responsible gaming initiatives whose purpose is
specifically designed to reduce gaming and, ipso facto, gaming revenue.").
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How CAN CASINOS BE HELD
LEAST PARTIALLY) ACCOUNTABLE
FOR ENFORCING SEPS?

If there is concern that casinos are
motivated to be active
partners in the enforcement of self-exclusions, are there appropriate measures
that can spur greater commitment? One
is to connect casino
enforcement efforts to licensing and regulatory standards. Casinos that are not
vigilant in excluding underage gamblers are subject to regulatory sanction. 95 As
noted above, however, applying the same
to detect a self-excluded
gambler is impractical. 96 If a casino knowingly disregarded the presence of a
self-excluded gambler on its premises, it is likely that regulators would impose
a sanction, assuming
were aware of it. 97 Such flagrant, bad faith actions
would probably be rare, or infrequently detected. 98 Though it can be difficult to
determine whether regulatory sanctions in any state have been assessed for
such a violation, there is no reported case of such a sanction
imposed and
challenged by the casino. Ultimately, it appears that regulatory sanctions have
not been a mechanism of accountability for failure to enforce SEPs,
Another means of creating incentives for casinos to be
in
95 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN.§ 725,19(2) (2015); see also supra note 70 and
accompanying text.
96 See discussion supra Part IV.
97
States rarely publish
of regulatory sanctions in a format
accessible by the public. But see, e.g., Press
Casino Violations Result in
$105,000 in Fines Levied by the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (May. 15,
Press Release, $128,000 in Fines
2013), http://gamingcontrolboard.pa.gov/?pr=5
Levied Against Two Casinos by the Pennsylvania
Control Board for
Violations (May. 23, 2012) http://gamingcontrolboard.pa.gov/?pr=466; Press
Release, Self-Exclusion List Violations Lead to $40,000 Fine for PA Casino
2010) available at http://gamingcontrolboard.pa.gov/?pr=372; Press Release
Self-Exclusion Violation Leads to $10,000 Fine for PA Casino
2010)
available at http://gamingcontrolboard.pa.gov/?pr=340; Press Release, SelfExclusion Violation Leads to $20,000 Fine for PA Casino
7, 2010) available
at http://gamingcontrolboard.pa.gov/?pr=336. Although state publications are rare,
casino SEP violations are still likely to be reported on by other sources. E.g., Brian
Pempus, Iowa Casino Allows Self-Banned Gambler to Play, CARD PLAYER
22, 2014), http://www.cardplayer.com/poker-news/17 l 33-iowa-casino-fined-forallowing-self-banned-gambler-to-play (discussing sanctions imposed on an Iowa
casino for allowing a self-excluded individual to gamble and even obtain a
card); Rivers Casino Fined for Soliciting Gamblers an Self-Exclusion List,
ABCl I.COM (Mar. 23, 2012, 2:29 PM), http://abcll.com/archive/8593325/
(discussing sanctions imposed by the Illinois Gaming Board in response to a casino
sending a self-excluded individual promotional materials).
98
Some have suggested the need for "an objective and
system of
monitoring and auditing industry utilization and compliance with self-exclusion
programmes [sic]." Blaszczynski et
supra note 43, at 66.
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self-exclusions is through civil court actions. For many years, gamblers have
filed lawsuits, or asserted counterclaims, against casinos seeking to recover
their losses. 99 Some of these cases allege that a casino facilitated the gambler's
addiction even when that casino was aware of the compulsive nature of the
gambler's activity. 100 In some instances, the effort to recover losses was based
on the claim the casino had knowingly permitted a visibly intoxicated gambler
to wager-and lose-large amounts of money. 101 Theories of recovery range
from negligence, intentional infliction of mental distress, contract claims, and a
host of statutory and regulatory bases. 102 Where serving of alcohol is involved,
dram shop theories are asserted. 103
Courts have not been sympathetic to these claims. In order for such a
negligence claim to be successful, the casino must have a duty to control the
gambler's behavior must exist, and courts have declined to impose such a duty.
Intentional tort theories have failed due to a lack of proof that the casino acted
in an "extreme and outrageous" manner. 104 Contract theories have floundered
due to a lack of proof that there was an agreement between the gambler and
casino that the casino would act in good faith to protect the gambler from
excessive losses. 105 The federal statutory and regulatory claims failed due to a
lack of any demonstration of "predicate criminal acts" by the casino. 106
In the time since SEPs have become widespread, gamblers have sued
casinos for failing to exclude them when they were on a self-exclusion list. In
Merrill v. Trump Indiana, Inc., a compulsive gambler alleged that he wrote a
casino and asked that he be excluded from its property. 107 Though the casino
placed him on its "eviction list," the gambler claimed he was allowed to return
to gamble at the casino, where he subsequently lost so much money he ended
See, e.g., Taveras v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., No. 07-4555, 2008 WL
4372791 at *2-3 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2008); Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs.,
876 F. Supp. 625, 627-28 (D.N.J. 1994); Tose v. Great Bay Hotel & Casino Inc.,
819 F. Supp. 1312, 1314 (D.N.J. 1993). See also Matt Pearce, Gambler Who Lost
$500,000 Sues, Saying Casino Let Him Play Drunk, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014),
http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/06/nation/la-na-nn-drunk-vegas-gambler-2014
0306. For a detailed analysis of this type oflitigation, see generally Justin E. Bauer,
Comment, Self-Exclusion & the Compulsive Gambler: The House Shouldn't
Always Win, 27 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 63 (2006); Irina Slavina, Note, Don't Bet on It:
Casinos' Contractual Duty to Stop Compulsive Gamblers from Gambling, 85 CmKENT L. REV. 369 (2010).
100 See, e.g., Taveras, 2008 WL 4372791 at *1.
99

101
102

103
104

105
106

107

See, e.g., Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1314.

See generally cases cited supra note 99.
See, e.g., Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1315-18.
E.g., Taveras, 2008 WL 4372791 at *5-6.
See id. at *6.
See id. at *7.
Merrill v. Trump Indiana, Inc., 320 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 2003).
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up robbing banks and going to prison. 108 At the time the gambler relapsed,
casinos were not required to maintain an eviction list. 109 But that may not have
made any difference. As the court put it:
Even if the amended regulation applied, however, it is by no means
certain that the regulation would sustain a cause of action against
Trump. Trump is required by regulation to maintain an exclusion log
and to add to that list individuals who request to be put on it. But
Trump's obligation to follow regulations promulgated by the Indiana
Gaming Commission does not automatically translate into a duty of
care owed to compulsive gamblers. At most, the rules impose upon
Trump a duty to the state through the gaming commission, not to a
self-requesting evictee.
If Trump violates regulations, it must answer to the gaming
commission-the current rules provide for administrative and
disciplinary hearings, as well as sanctions against casinos, including
fines and rescindment of licenses. 110
The court held that if the legislature had wanted to create a private right of
action, in favor of a gambler against a casino that did not follow regulations
regarding self'.-exclusions, it would have said so explicitly. m The statutory and
regulatory regime for gambling in the state was so voluminous, including
administrative sanctions enforced by the gaming commission, that the absence
of any reference to a private right of action was telling. 112 Finally, the court
declined to find any common law duty on the casino's part to honor eviction
. .
113
prov1s10ns.
Courts are in accord that when casinos don't enforce regulatory provisions
relating to SEPs, they may face administrative sanctions, but they are not
subject to civil liability to the gambler. 114 The obligation, such as it is, that
casinos have to enforce SEPs is one owed to regulators, who may or may not
sanction the offending licensee for violations. The absence of liability may also
be a matter of enforcing provisions in the self-exclusion agreement itself
whereby the gambler releases the casino from any liability. 115 Or, as in New
108
109

110
Ill
112

See id. at 730-31.
See id. at 732.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 732-33.
See, e.g., Nelson v. MGM Grand Hotel, LLC, 287 F. App'x 587, 589 (9th
Cir. 2008); Fleeger v. Bell, 23 F. App'x. 741, 743 (9th Cir. 2001).
115
See, e.g., IOWA GAMING Ass'N, supra note 10, at 2 ("I will not seek to hold
113

114

the Casinos liable in any way should I continue gambling at any casino after the
date of this exclusion request. Specifically, I . . . hereby release and forever
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by statute:
c. A licensed casino or
facility or employee thereof shall
not be liable to any self·excluded person or to any other party in any
proceeding for any
monetary or otherwise, which may
arise as a result of:
( 1) the failure of a licensed casino or simulcasting facility to
withhold gaming privileges from, or restore gaming privileges
a self-excluded person; or
(2) otherwise permitting a self-excluded person to engage in
gaming activity in such licensed casino or simulcasting facility
while on the list of self-·excluded persons.
One might wonder whether it is good public policy to immunize casinos
from civil liability when they act in contravention of a SEP. Is administrative
sanction without fear of damage awards by the civil justice system sufficient
incentive for the casino to be scrupulous in its enforcement of a SEP? It may be
that this
has the simple answer of "no." Nevertheless, imposing civil
liability to create such incentives would lead to substantial moral hazard risks.
A gambler who believes he or she is protected against the risk of excessive
losses
casino responsibility for failure to enforce the gambler's selfexclusion has no reason to adjust the behavior that led him or her to execute the
self-exclusion in the first place. Allowing civil recovery reinforces the concern
that gamblers could view it as primarily the casino's responsibility to enforce
the self-exclusion, rather than the gambler's duty to observe it for him/herself.
This undcm1ines the SEP's objective of acting as an acknowledgement by the
gambler of his or her problem, and taking steps to control it.
The upshot is this: casinos lack incentives that would encourage them to
meaningful resources into helping to enforce SEPs. The potential winnings
of the self-excluded gambler are constrained by the practicalities of claiming
winnings; losses are not. Administrative sanctions for lack of enforcement
gamblers against casinos for
efforts are likely insubstantial. Comt actions
failing to enforce SEPs have been met with little success, and, as a matter of
furthering the
of SEPs, this is probably the appropriate result. These
are important limitations to bear in mind when assessing the utility of SEPs in
addressing problem gambling.

discharge the Casinos, their parent companies, all of their direct and indirect
subsidiaries, their partners, agents, employees, officers, affiliates, directors,
successors, and assigns, and those with whom the Casinos may lawfully share
information regarding this exclusion, including the Iowa Racing and Gaming
Commission ... from any and all claims in law or equity .... ").
116 NJ. STAT.§ 5:12-71.2 (2014). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 27:27.l(D)
(2014).
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ARE SEPS A DISTRACTION?

Although the first SEP was in response to a citizen's request,
forces have historically driven SEPs. 117 In the struggle to understand and
address the complicated set of factors that lead to a person not being able to
gamble responsibly, SEPs "have become the predominant harm-reduction
strategy used by the gaming industly." 118 But there are numerous other
a
strategies that can be employed to deal with problem gambling. In
few of these, it is appropriate to ask: does the emphasis on SEPs distract from
consideration of these alternatives? Is the support of SEPs by the gaming
industry, especially given the limitations noted above, a way of reinforc ing
distraction?
An exhaustive analysis of all the proposals and means to address problem
gambling is beyond the scope of this discussion. Indeed, the literature on this
has been substantial. !1 9 But even a brief survey illustrates the opportunities for
study and implementation. These measures are notable because they change the
focus from being exclusively on the gambler, and direct attention to the way in
which the games are offered.
Problem gambling can, and does, exist across the panoply of gambling
opportunities. 120 Research has shown, however, that machine gambling has a
greater addictive capacity than other forms of gambling. 121 Some researchers
suggest that this is a function of "the solitary, continuous, rapid wagering [the
machines] enable." 122 Games , like craps and blackjack involve human
interaction and social feedback. Machine play is different, as Natasha Dow
Schull's book-Addiction by Design: Machine Gambling in Las Vegasdescribes: "[t]he solitary, uninterrupted process of machine play, by contrast,
111 See Gainsbury, supra note 40, at 231; Self-Exclusion 101, supra note 19
(explaining how the first SEP came about).
118 Gainsbury, supra note 40, at 231.
119 See, e.g., id.; Bauer, supra note 99; Hon. Janette A. Bertness, Problem
Gambling: Legal & Medical Issues, 58 R.I.B.J. 13 (Sept/Oct. 2009), available at
https://www.ribar.com/UserFiles/Sept-Oct%2009%20Journal.pdf; Blaszczynski et
al., supra note 43; Hao et al., supra note 52; Roundtable Discussion, supra note 69.
120 Judy Herriff, Gambling: The Hidden Addiction, 88 MICH. B.J. 54, 56 (May
2009) ("Incidences of problem and pathological gambling have risen as gambling
becomes more accessible .... People gamble at casinos, participate in the ...
lottery, play bingo or card games at charitable gaming events, bet at a home
or participate in illegal forms of gambling such as Internet or remote gambling,
sports betting, office pools, or animal fights.").
121
See Robert B. Breen & Mark Zimmerman, Rapid Onset of Pathological
Gambling in Machine Gamblers, 18 J. GAMBLING STUD, 31, 32 (Spring 2002),
122 Natasha Dow Schull, Slot Machines are Designed to Addict, N.Y, TIMES
(Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013il 0/09/are-casinostoo-much-of-a-gamble/slot-machines-are-designed-to-addict.
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tends to produce a steady, trancelike state that 'distracts from internal and
.
' sue h as anxiety,
.
d epress1on,
.
ull''s .b oo k
extemal issues
an d b ore dom. "123 Schu
examines the way manufacturers design machines to promote
play that
inhibits reflection. 124 An important development was the replacement of gear
driven pull handles with electronic push buttons. 125 This allowed for expedited
play that increased the number of plays per minute and hour. 126 Similarly, bill
validators, which allow for the insertion of larger denominations of currency
into the machine, compress the spending gestures needed to fund continuous
127 Feeding coins into the machine for each play is no longer necessary;
instead, the machine displays the amount of money the player put in the
machine that could be drawn upon for betting. 128 Also, the money inserted
could be converted to "credits," de-materializing the money being lost (or
won). 129 These developments are all part of the computerization of slot
machines. This conversion of slot machines from mechanical devices to
computerized machines enabled casinos to exercise precise controls over odds
and payback percentage. 130
Schull writes of problem gamblers who talk about being in a "zone" when
they are gambling on machines. 131 They gamble not necessarily as a means to
win money, but as an end in itself. 132 According to Schull's research,
everything---from the layout of the machines on the casino
to the design
of the chairs the gambler sits in-is meant to promote the "zone" experience. 133
Machine gamblers who are in the zone don't want to be interrupted and view
the solitary nature of the activity as comforting. 134 Machines and their
123 NATASHA Dow SCHULL, ADDICTION BY DESIGN: MACHINE GAMBLING IN
LAS VEGAS 18-19 (2012) (quoting Anna C. Thomas et al., A Theoretical Model of
EGM Problem Gambling: More than a Cognitive Escape, 8 INT'L J. OF MENTAL
HEALTH & ADDICTION 7 (2009)).
124 Id. at 52, 68.
125 Id. at 54.
126 See id. at 54-55.
127 Id. at 56.
12s Id.
129 Id.

See generally id. at 81-82.
Id. at 19.
132 Id. at 12 (noting the machine gambler's "aim is not to win but simply to
continue").
133 Chapter 1 of Schull's book examines the role of casino floor plans in
promoting the feeling that the machine gambler is entering a "secluded, private
playing world." Id. at 41 (quoting Bill Friedman, Designing Casinos to Dominate
the Competition, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF GAMBLING & COMMERCIAL GAMING, at
12 (2000)). Casinos also pay careful attention to the ergonomics of a machine
player's chair so he or she is comfortable sitting for extended periods. Id. at 67.
134 Id.
at 41 (noting gamblers "want to be isolated in their own private,
130

131
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environment are designed to promote the gambler's "time-on-device" so that
the odds in the house's favor are allowed to take their inevitable toll. 135
With this in mind, one step that could be taken would be to require
machines to operate at a slower pace. If the speed of the game helps to promote
the "zone," regulatory standards could address this. It is not a given, however,
that this would alter the machine gambler's behavior. It may be that slowing
down play causes the gambler to play longer. 136 Similarly, some have proposed
that signs need to be placed on machines that give clear information about the
odds of winning. 137 But to an addicted gambler who is playing to play, and not
necessarily to win, this information may be superfluous. That is, the odds are
beside the point. 138
What about time limits on a machine counting down the time the player
has left to play before a mandatory break in play is imposed? Duration controls
would interrupt play, and require the gambler to at least take a breath before
resuming gambling. But could it also have the effect of making the panicked
gambler bet more as time runs out? 139 Scrolling messages that tell the player
how long he or she has been gambling may disrupt the "zone" and allow for
reflection. Showing how much a gambler has won or lost in dollars, rather than
credits, would be a reminder that real money is at stake. So would messages or
signs instructing a gambler to "set yourself a limit and don't exceed it." 140 How
these examples would affect gambling behavior is still an open question.
Other ideas for trying to limit problem gamblers' momentum include
intimiate world" (quoting Friedman, supra note 134, at 66) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
135 For a general discussion of "time-on-device," see id. at 58-68.
136 See id. at 273 (noting that "limits on the number of credits bet per tum
might prolong play rather than decrease expenditure, while slowing reel speed
might cause more aggressive play [while] random timeouts might provoke
gamblers to jump to new machines" and that "problem gamblers would find ways
to circumvent any limits programmed into machines and persist at their excessive
behavior").
137 See id. at 268 (discussing how the odds of hitting a particular combination
could be better explained to machine gamblers).
138 "If it is true that problem gamblers suffer from substantial and irrational
cognitive distortions during their gambling activities, it follows that this is not the
most opportune time to intervene upon them by introducing rational mechanisms."
Id. at 376 n.52 (quoting Bo Bernhard & F.W. Preston, On the Shoulders of Merton:
Potentially Sobering Consequences of Problem Gambling Policy, 47 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 1395, 1402-03 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)). These
messages may be "much like trying to talk sense into alcoholics who are passed
out." Id. at 271.
139 See id. at 273 (discussing a machine gambler who said he would "probably
double [his] bet" ifhe saw he "was running out of time").
140 See Hao et al., supra note 52, at 362.

52

UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:29

machine signage about responsible gambling, 141 not allowing the provision of
free alcohol, 142 requiring player cards to be inserted so casinos could track the
losses of gamblers, 143 and forbidding the use of "false wins." 144 False wins are
produced when slot machine gamblers play multi-line games, where there are,
for example, twenty different pay lines. 145 If a player has a win on nine of the
twenty lines, he or she loses money. Yet, the machine reacts by telling the
player, "you're a winner!" 146 Research has shown that the "false win" can
reinforce the addictive behavior by giving players a "false psychological
boost. " 147
A similar tactic is the "near miss," where, a jackpot symbol appears
directly above or below the pay line. 148 It appears to the player that he or she
was only one "click" away from winning. 149 In fact, "the symbols displayed
above or below the pay line have nothing to do with how close the player was
to winning the jackpot."150Computerized slot machines make it possible to
program near misses into the game. 151 Research has suggested that the near
miss motivates gamblers to press on because they are so "close" to winning. 152
Blaszczynski et al., supra note 43, at 68.
See Gainsbury, supra note 40, at 230 (noting that "electronic gaming
machine players . . . often experience a loss of control and are more likely to
exceed spending limits when they consume alcohol").
143 See Hao et al., supra note 52, at 364.
144 See Randall Stross, I'm Losing Money. So Why Do I Feel So Good?, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/0l/13/business/how-slotmachines-raise-our-hopes-even-when-were-losing.html?_r=O.
145 Id.; see generally Kevin A. Harrigan, Slot Machines: Pursuing Responsible
Gaming Practices for Virtual Reels and Near Misses, 7 INT'L J. OF MENTAL
HEALTH ADDICTION 68 (2009).
146 For an illustration of false wins presented by the Problem Gambling
Institute of Ontario (Canada), see Gambling Research, Slots Tutorial: An
Introduction to Losses Disguised as Wins, YouTuBE (Feb. 25, 2011), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ms-BovQOlSw.
147 Mary Dooe & Genevieve Gilson, Even When You 're Losing, Slot Machines
Boost Your Morale-and Casinos Profit, PRI.ORG (Aug. 22, 2014, 1:45 PM), http://
www.pri.org/stories/2014-08-22/even-when-youre-losing-slot-machines-boost-your
-morale-and-casino-profits (quoting Natasha Dow Schull).
148 About Slot Machines, PROBLEM GAMBLING INST. ONTARIO, http://www.
problemgambling.ca/gambling-help/gambling-information/about-slot-machines.
aspx#near_misses (last visited June 30, 2015); see also Roff Smith, Near Wins
Stoke Gamblers' Brains, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (March 1, 2014), http://news.national
geographic.com/news/2014/02/140228-gambling-brain-win-slot-machines/.
149 About Slot Machines, supra note 148.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.; see generally Mike J. Dixon et al., The Frustrating Effects of Just
141

142
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Some jurisdictions, like Nevada, prohibit the use of near misses. 153
The measures described above focus on trying to "fix" the machine so that
features that may promote and reinforce addictive gambling behavior are
proscribed or limited. But some have proposed that machines could be designed
to
responsible gambling behavior. 154 In part, the machine would
provide detailed information to the gambler about how much money he or she
has put in to and taken out of the machine and the duration of play. 155 More
importantly, the machine would allow gamblers to limit the amount bet on the
machine, both per game and per session, and to set time and money limits on
. pay.
l 156
t h e1r
In 2004, a Canadian machine manufacturer, Techlink Entertainment,
developed what they called a "Responsible Gaming Device" (RGD), which
incorporated these features. 157 It may be that such machines would find support
from both industty and gamblers' advocates.
The RGD amounts to a kind of compromise between consumer
advocates' call for product transparency, and the industry's call for
personal responsibility-a compromise, that is, between those who
believe in an unfettered free market and those that believe that
consumers need some form of "fettering." The compromise takes the
form of a machine equipped to help gamblers "self-fetter." 158
Technological developments like the RGD illustrate that technology does
not have to be dialed back to address problem gambling. Few would believe
that reverting to pull handles and coin insertion is advisable or would
significantly diminish problem gambling. However, thoughtful research and
Missing the Jackpot: Slot Machine Near-Misses Trigger Large Skin Conductance
Responses, But No Post-Reinforcement Pauses, 29 J. GAMBLING STUD. 661 (2013);
see also Smith, supra note 148.
153 Kevin A. Harrigan, Slot Machine Structural Characteristics: Creating Near
Misses Using High Award Symbol Ratios, 6 INT'L J. OF MENTAL HEALTH
ADDICTION 353, 353, 359 (2008) (discussing a 1989 Nevada Gaming Commission
"ruling that the proprietary computer algorithms used by one slot machine
manufacturer to create a high number of near misses on the payline [sic] are
'unacceptable'"). A third tactic is the use of a "stop" button on a slot machine,
which gives the player the illusion of control over the game and the result. Schull,
supra note 123, at 83-84 (stating that, however, the outcome is determined even
before the reels begin to spin).
154 See SCHULL, supra note 123, at 275.
155 See, e.g., id. at 278.
156 See, e.g., id.
157 Id. at 275; see Responsible Gaming, TECHLINK ENTM'T, http://www.tech
linkentertainment.com/social-responsibilin;/ (last visited June 30, 2015).
158 SCHULL, supra note 123, at 276.
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development of ideas of how machine makers, and casinos, can be part of the
solution rather than part of the problem is essential. No single measure will be
perfect, and there will always be criticism of efforts to modify the gambling
environment. Nevertheless, the concept of what it means to make a "better
mousetrap" 159 for machine gamblers can be changed.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion illustrates the many alternatives to SEPs, as a
way of addressing addictive gambling behavior. Gaming industry
representatives emphasize that most people play slot machines-even rapid-fire
slot machines with near misses, false wins, and stop buttons-and do not
develop gambling disorders. 160 According to this perspective, it is the
psychological make-up of the gambler, not the machine, which produces the
destructive, addictive behavior. 161 Yet, there is considerable research
supporting the conclusion that addictive machine gambling is a function of
some type of interaction between gambler and machine. As Schull says, "[t]he
whole modus operandi of the industry is to approach the human being as
something that's manipulable. So I find it disingenuous that they then tum
around and argue that 100% of the responsibility for any harm is on the
person." 162
In light of these interests, what is the proper balance to be struck between
gamblers having responsibility for their own gambling behavior, and casinos
not offering games that exploit addictive tendencies of certain gamblers?
Regulators have an abundance of social science research to consider in
addressing this question. 163 This research is ongoing and these behavioral

159
160

See Schull, supra note 122.
See Responsible Gaming, AM. GAMING Ass'N, http://www.american

gaming.org/social-responsibility/responsible-gaming (last visited June 30, 2015)
("Although the vast majority of Americans are able to gamble responsibly, a small
percentage of people-approximately 1 percent of the adult population-cannot.").
161 See generally DAVID STEWART, ROPES & GRAY, LLP, DEMYSTIFYING SLOT
MACHINES AND THEIR IMPACT IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (2010), available at
http://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/whitepapers/demy
stifying_slot_machines_and_their_impact. pdf.
162 Brad Plumer, Slot Machine Science: How Casinos Get You to Spend More
Money, VOX.COM (March 1, 2015), http://www.vox.com/2014/8/7/5976927/slotmachines-casinos-addiction-by-design (quoting Natasha Dow Schull).
163 One representative and excellent example is The Journal of Gambling
Studies. Published quarterly,
The Journal of Gambling Studies is an interdisciplinary forum for research
and discussion of the many and varied aspects of gambling behavior, both
controlled and pathological. Coverage extends to the wide range of
attendant and resultant problems, including alcoholism, suicide, crime, and

Spring 2015]

SELF-EXCLUSION PROGRAMS

55

findings need to inform the proper balance between industry accountability and
gambler responsibility. A better understanding of the complex and tragic forces
underlying problem gambling will likely only come about through careful
research.
Few people would argue that SEPs have no role in addressing problem
gambling. But however structured, the limitations of SEPs are many. Efforts to
refine SEPs may be appropriate, 164 though their systemic limitations will
remain. 165 But attention to SEPs should not substitute for creative thinking
about the gaming industry's role in promoting responsible gambling. There
needs to be recognition that SEPs cannot continue to be the "predominant
harm-reduction strategy used by the gaming industry." 166 Meaningful inroads in
diminishing the tragic effects of problem gambling will require commitments
by both gamblers and the industry that go far beyond the gambler's decision to
address his or her problem by self-excluding.

a number of other mental health concerns. Articles published in this
journal span a cross-section of disciplines including psychiatry,
psychology, sociology, political science, criminology, and social work.
About This Journal: Aims & Scope, J. OF GAMBLING STUD., http://link.springer.
com/joumal/10899 (last visited June 30, 2015).
164 For a discussion of how SEPs could take the fonn of an "unwelcome
persons" list rather than a self-exclusion list, see William N. Thompson et al.,
Remedying the Lose-Lose Game of Compulsive Gambling: Voluntary Exclusions,
Mandatory Exclusions, or an Alternative Method?, 40 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV.
1221, 1255-57 (2007).
165 As Carol O'Hare wrote:
The more we try to revise and reshape these programs in response to
everyone's questions, concerns, preferences, and legal challenges, the
more complex, and possibly less effective they may become. And the
more complex the programs, the more costly and difficult they will be to
manage. The more difficult they are to manage, the easier it will be for
gamblers to break the rules without being caught. And the less they get
caught, the more they may exercise their denial by filing suit.
In the long run, the greatest risk is that everyone will lose sight of why the
programs were created in the first place-because someone who couldn't
control his gambling wanted our help.
O'Hare, supra note 65, at 191.
166 Gainsbury, supra note 40, at 231.
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APPENDIX

State

State
Mandated?

Colorado
Delaware
Florida*
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Nevada*
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No I Yes 169
Yes
Yes
Yes

Spouse/Family
Request
Allowed?
No
No

Revocation of
Privileges?**

Prohibition on
Collecting
Winnings/Losses?

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

--

--

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

--

Yes
Yes
Yes

J

Statewide
Exclusion?
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

Removal from
list
available?***
Yes
Yes

Term of
Exclusion**
**
3, 5, 10, Life
1, 5, Life

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes167
Yes168

5, Life
1,5,Life
Life
2, Life
5
1, 3, 5, Life
2, Life
Life
5 -Life
Life

--

Yes
Yes
Yes

Waiverof
Li.ability?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

1, 5, Life
Yes
1, 3 5 Other Yes
1, 3, 5
Yes

See 13-3 MISS. CODE R.§ 10.5(a) (LexisNexis 2015) (specifying that removal is automatic upon expiration of the term).
See Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 11, § 45-17.060(1) (2015) (allowing petition to have the lifetime exclusion lifted after 5
169
See NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 5.
(requiring that each licensee
in the issuance of
check cashing, or the direct mail
gaming opportunities, shall implement a program that allows patrons to self-limit their access to the issuance of
check cashing, direct mail
by the licensee).
167
168
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Yes
Yes
Yes
Ohio
No
--Oklahoma*
No
-Pennsylvania
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
---Rhode Island*
Yes
South Dakota*
-No
-West Virginia* No
--* Individual casino licensees and operators establish their own self-exclusion programs.
**Revocation of privileges includes comps, issuance of credit, check cashing privileges,
*** Removal procedures are never applicable to lifetime bans.
**** Measured in years.

Yes
No
Yes
No
-

-
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Yes

1, 5, life

Yes

-

-

--

--

----

---

Yes
-

club memberships, etc.

1, 5, life

Yes

--

